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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: EAVESDROPPING-
LEGAL AND MORAL PROBLEMS
Introduction
Although the problem of eavesdropping
is widely discussed today, it is not a prob-
lem peculiar to our society. Eavesdropping
was considered a crime at common law,'
and as early as 1881 New York adopted
its first eavesdropping statute.2 With the
invention of the telegraph and telephone,
wiretapping, which is really only a special-
ized form of eavesdropping,' came into
existence. 4 The use of these practices was
not limited to law-enforcement officers;
businessmen, newspaper reporters, private
detectives, and criminals all found them
extremely helpful means of obtaining in-
formation.5 Revelations of the type and
extent of eavesdropping became shocking;
the need for legislation, apparent. When
Congress enacted Section 605 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act,6 it forbade wire-
1 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 169 (1769);
2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1718 (12th ed.
1932).
2 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 387, 388 (1959).
3 Eavesdropping may be defined as "surreptitious
fact-collecting affecting individual privacy."
DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVES-
DROPPERS 7 (1959). Eavesdropping, when used
in this note, does not include wiretapping.
4 Id. at 23-25.
5 Id. at 23-34.
648 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
tapping, but not eavesdropping. It made
the section all-inclusive, so that even law-
enforcement tapping is forbidden.
Apart from the statutory prohibition of
kwiretapping, a further question arises when
law-enforcement officers obtain evidence
through eavesdropping or wiretapping and
attempt to introduce such evidence in a
criminal trial. Basic constitutional and
moral rights are involved. The purpose of
this note is to discuss the legal and moral
problems connected with law-enforcement
eavesdropping and wiretapping.
Status of the Law
Before wiretapping was forbidden by
statute, the objection was raised that police
wiretapping to obtain evidence to be used
against an accused in a criminal trial vio-
lated the fourth and fifth amendments to
the federal constitution. This argument was
rejected by the Supreme Court in the his-
toric case of Olmstead v. United States.7
Relying upon the literal meaning of the
provision that "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... 8
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing for a ma-
jority of the Court, determined that wire-
tapping does not violate the fourth amend-
ment. There can be no infringement upon
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
s U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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a citizen's fourth amendment rights "un-
less there has been an official search and
seizure of his person, or such a seizure of
his papers or his tangible material effects,
or an actual physical invasion of his house
'or curtilage' for the purpose of making
a seizure." 9 Moreover, the Chief Justice
reasoned that one who installs a telephone
in his house intends to project his voice
outside the house, and there is no con-
stitutional protection afforded to the wires
beyond his house nor the messages carried
over them.
Eavesdropping may or may not be for-
bidden by the fourth amendment, depend-
ing upon whether there has been a tres-
pass. Goldman v. United States0 deter-
mined that use of a detectaphone, which
does not require any physical intrusion into
the room from which the sounds are being
picked up, does not violate a person's con-
stitutional rights. The Court felt that this
method of obtaining evidence could not
be distinguished from wiretapping, and re-
affirmed the rationale of the Olmstead case.
However, prior to their using the detecta-
phone, the agents had entered the defend-
ant's office in order to place microphones
there. The microphones did not function
properly, and thus they used the detecta-
phone. The Court indicated that had the
agents obtained evidence by means of these
microphones, the original trespass might
have constituted this an illegal search and
seizure. Since the trespass did not ma-
terially aid in the use of the detectaphone,
no impairment of the accused's constitu-
tional rights took place. However, where
the trespass materially aids or is connected
with the eavesdropping, there is a violation
90lmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928).
10 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
of fundamental constitutional rights. 1 This
is true whether the police officers commit
a trespass in order to "plant" the listening
device,12 or whether the device itself in-
trudes into a constitutionally protected
area. 3
To protect rights not guaranteed by the
Constitution, Congress, faced with public
protest against wiretapping, 14 passed the
Federal Communications Act in 1934.15
Section 605 provides: "[N]o person not
being authorized by the sender shall inter-
cept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance,
purpose, effect, or meaning of such inter-
cepted communication to any person .... "
The scope of the section is all-inclusive;
no exception is made for federal or state
police officers. Any interception and di-
vulgence by any person without the per-
mission of the sender is forbidden. It is
not clear whether the mere interception
of a telephone message, without divulgence
of its contents, violates the statute.1 6
The Attorney General of the United States,
however, has interpreted the section as
allowing wiretapping in certain cases, so
long as there is no divulgence.' 7 Another
problem that has arisen under the statute
11 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954).
12 Irvine v. California, supra note 11.
"3Silverman v. United States, supra note 11.
14 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 163, 165 (1960).
548 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
16 See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96,
100 (1957); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S.
107, 108 n.3 (1957); Weiss v. United States, 308
U.S. 321, 322 (1939) (dictum).
17 Kennedy, Attorney General's Opinion on
Wiretaps, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1962, § 6 (Maga-
zine), p. 21, at p. 80.
is whether the permission of both parties
is necessary before the contents of an in-
tercepted telephone conversation may be
communicated to others. The Supreme
Court in Rathbun v. United States' de-
cided that where one party to the conver-
sation allows a police officer to listen in
by using an extension, the statute is not
violated. The Court, however, emphasized
the fact that extensions are quite commonly
used, and that it did not want to extend
the interpretation of the act to the point
of forbidding persons from allowing others
to "listen in" on extensions. 19 It has also
been determined that the statute applies to
intrastate as well as interstate communica-
tions.2 0
Having established that wiretapping is
not forbidden by the fourth amendment,
but only by statute, and that eavesdropping
does violate the fourth amendment when a
trespass is involved, the next question is
whether evidence obtained by such means
is admissible in criminal trials. Weeks v.
United States21 established the rule that
evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment is inadmissible in fed-
eral courts. Thus evidence obtained by
eavesdropping involving a trespass is inad-
missible.2 2 This would apply whether the
evidence were obtained by federal or state
officials. 23 This rule was extended to state
courts by the recent decision of Mapp v.
Ohio,2 4 in which the Supreme Court held
that unconstitutionally obtained evidence
18355 U.S. 107 (1957).
:9 Id. at 109-10.
20 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
21 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961).
23 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960),
35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 139 (1961).
24 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1962
cannot be admitted in state criminal trials.
Wiretapping presents a somewhat dif-
ferent problem, since no infringement of
constitutional rights is involved. Yet the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal
Communications Act as forbidding the in-
troduction of wiretap evidence into federal
courts.21 This rule was extended to exclude
evidence derived indirectly through the
use of wiretaps-"a fruit of the poisonous
tree" 2 -and also wiretap evidence obtained
by state officials. 27 The Supreme Court has
construed this exclusionary rule as a fed-
eral rule of evidence, and refused to extend
it to state courts.2" In New York wiretap
evidence is admissible in criminal trials. 29
Moreover, New York and some other
states, specifically allow wiretapping by
law-enforcement officers under certain cir-
cumstances.3" However, the validity of
these statutes has become somewhat doubt-
ful because of the language in Benanti v.
United States."' In that case the Court
stated: "[W]e find that Congress, setting
out a prohibition in plain terms, did not
mean to allow state legislation which would
contradict that section .... "32 Irrespective
25Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379
(1937).
20 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
27 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
28Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
29 People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, - N.E.2d
, -N.Y.S.2d- (1962).
30 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 authorizes interception
under certain prescribed conditions. The proce-
dure for this is found in N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 813-a.
31 355 U.S. 96 (1957); see Matter of Intercep-
tion of Tel. Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121,
170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958), wherein
Judge Hofstadter indicated he could no longer
issue wiretap orders.
32 Benanti v. United States, supra note 27, at
105-06.
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of the validity of such state legislation per-
mitting wiretapping under certain circum-
stances, there is no doubt that such conduct
is a violation of Section 605 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act."3
Since Mapp v. Ohio 3 4 extended the ex-
clusionary rule to state courts in cases
where evidence was obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment, the question
arises what effect this decision has on the
admissibility of wiretap evidence in state
courts. In People v. Dinan,3 a recent New
York Court of Appeals case, the appellant
argued that Mapp overruled Schwartz v.
Texas3 6 "by reading the exclusionary rule
into section 605 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act, as, by analogy, it was read
by Mapp into the Fourth Amendment, '" 37
which applies to the states. The court
would not accept this argument. It em-
phasized the fact that wiretapping does
not violate the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure
and stated that "a statute may not possess
the sanction of a constitutional inhibition
protecting against fundamental rights grant-
ing immunity from unreasonable search
and seizure. '38 The exclusionary rule, the
court continued, is a rule of public policy
adopted by the federal courts, and applied
to the states by Mapp in order to aid in the
33 See text accompanying note 15 supra. Admis-
sion of such evidence in a criminal trial could
lead to the prosecution of the District Attorney,
police officials, and perhaps the presiding judge.
MARKS & POPERNO, CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW
YORK § 425-c, at 533 (1961).
34367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35 11 N.Y.2d 350, - N.E.2d -, N.Y.S.2d
- (1962).
36 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
3 People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 354,
N.E.2d , , - N.Y.S.2d
(1962).
38 Id. at 354-55, N.E.2d at
N.Y.S.2d at
enforcement of the fundamental law. The
wiretapping cases left it to the states to
determine whether such a rule should be
applied by them to help enforce the Fed-
eral Communications Act. There is some
indication, the court reasoned, that the
Supreme Court agrees with this view,
since it cited the Schwartz case as authority
for refusing to enjoin the admission of wire-
tap evidence into a state court several
months prior to its famed Mapp decision. 9
Thus wiretap evidence remains admissible
in New York state courts unless and until
the Supreme Court decides otherwise.
Legal-Moral Problems
The Founding Fathers of our nation,
realizing the horrors of tyranny, sought to
protect American citizens from tyrannical
practices on the part of government."
The fourth and fifth amendments to the
Constitution play a fundamental role in
this plan. The protection afforded by the
fourth amendment might be summed up
as the protection of the right of privacy.
Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed this clearly
in his dissent in the Olmstead4 1 decision.
He stated:
They [the makers of our Constitution] con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.4 2
39 Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961)
(per curiam).
40 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478-79 (1928) (dissenting opinion); Waldman
& Silver, The Ethics, Morals and Legality of
Eavesdropping, 9 BROOKLYN BARRISTER 147, 148
(1957).
.11 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
42 Id. at 478 (dissenting opinion).
Although a majority of the Court did not
agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis, and held
that wiretapping does not violate any con-
stitutional right to privacy, the question
may be raised whether this practice, and
that of eavesdropping, are in reality any
less an invasion of an individual's privacy
than an unreasonable search and seizure.
When a police officer enters a home or of-
fice, he may take tangible items which
would prove incriminating. He may also
examine private letters and papers for evi-
dence of the commission of a crime. But
by the use of a detectaphone, which is not
constitutionally forbidden, 4 3 he may hear
the most intimate family conversations, or
privileged communications between at-
torney and client, doctor and patient, and
confessor and penitent. Some feel that
eavesdropping is even worse than an un-
reasonable search and seizure.4 4 Although
a wiretap may be less revealing be-
cause the investigator's "eavesdropping"
is limited to telephone conversations, the
rights of other parties may be infringed.
This is particularly true when a public
telephone is tapped, for then every person
who uses the phone is subjected to the
wiretap.
At first glance the observation might
be made that unless a person has some-
thing to hide, the fact that a police officer
is listening to his conversation should not
disturb him. However, it must be re-
membered that our constitutional guaran-
tees are a recognition of man's spiritual
nature. Each man's thoughts, emotions and
sensations are his own, and should not be
unreasonably subjected to government in-
terference. 45 Even though the mere inter-
43See text accompanying note 10 supra.
44See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 145-46 (1954).
45 See Olmstead v. United States, supra note
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ception of a citizen's expression of his
thoughts does not directly interfere with
them, there is an indirect interference.
The right to freely express one's thoughts
depends in large measure upon the preser-
vation of the right to express them with the
confidence that no one is surreptitiously
eavesdropping on the conversation. 46 Once
this confidence has disappeared, man's
willingness to express himself openly to
those to whom he chooses to reveal his
thoughts diminishes. The unrestricted use
by police officers of listening device*s, es-
pecially if widespread, is a tactic to be
expected in a tyrannical society, but cer-
tainly not in democracy.
The general right of privacy closely re-
sembles the moral right that each individ-
ual has to his secrets. "A secret is a matter
(e.g., an invention, valuable information,
concealed virtues, the fact that a crime has
been committed) known privately by only
one person or by so few that it is neither
public property nor notorious. ' '4 7 There
are three types of secrets - 1 ) a natural
secret, which arises from the very nature
of the matter, and cannot be revealed
without causing injury or annoyance to
another; 2) a promised secret, wherein a
person promises not to reveal the matter
after he has learned of it, no matter from
whom; and 3) an entrusted secret, in
which there is an antecedent promise not
to reveal the matter. The entrusted secret
is implicit when demanded by the confi-
dential nature of the communications, such
as those between confessor and peni-
tent, doctor and patient, or even between
40, at 478 (dissenting opinion); Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (dis-
senting opinion).
46 Ibid.
47 2 MCHUGH & CALLAN, MORAL THEOLOGY
§ 2408 (rev. ed. 1958) (emphasis added).
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friends.4 8 The right to one's secrets is a
strict property right'-9 which is violated
when others, who have no right to it, seek
to learn the secret, or reveal it, or use
secret knowledge. 0 The state, however,
may investigate when there is a question
whether a crime has been committed, or
will be committed, in order to prevent
harm to the public or private good.5 1 But
this right does not justify the use of unlaw-
ful means of investigation .1 Wiretapping,
eavesdropping, and the disclosing of in-
formation obtained thereby, can be justi-
fied on the part of public officials because
these officials have the right to seek after
the information.13 However, when the
stealth or force is excessive in its manner
or produces unnecessary harm, then it be-
comes sinful and there is a duty of resti-
tution.5 4
This right of the state to investigate se-
crets does not give it a blanket permission
to probe into anyone's private affairs.
Since wiretapping and eavesdropping are
analogous to opening a person's mail, or
reading an opened letter, the moral prin-
ciples involved there would also seem to
apply in this case. Public authorities may
open and read an individual's personal
mail when this becomes necessary to avoid
grave harm to the state.1 5 As long as there
is sufficient indication that the public good
48Ibid.; DAvis, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOL-
OGY 117-18 (1952).
49 2 McHUGH & CALLAN, op. cit. supra note 47,
at § 2409.
50 2 NOLDIN-SCHMITT, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MO-
RALIS § 666.2 (1951).
51 2 MCHUGH & CALLAN, Op. cit. supra note 47,
at § 2410.
52 Ibid.
5 See id. at § 2420.
54 2 MCHUGH & CALLAN, op. cit. supra note 47,
at § 2420.
55 2 NOLDIN-SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note 50, at
§ 672.
demands such investigation, it is permis-
sible. 6 Thus, in time of war the state may
censor all mail as a means of self-defense.5 7
But how can public officers determine
whether there is sufficient reason for open-
ing an individual's mail in a given case?
Since private individuals may also violate
a person's right to the secrecy of his letters
as a matter of self-defense when there is
prudent reaon for thinking a letter con-
tains something gravely and unjustly harm-
ful,58 this same reasoning would seem to
apply to public officials. So long as there
is sufficient reason for believing the letter
contains information which these officials
have a right to know, such as evidence of
the commission of a crime, and the public
good demands an investigation of the
matter, there would seem to be no unjust
violation of the individual's right to his
secrets.
The extent of a person's right to privacy
is not the only problem encountered in the
use of surreptitious listening devices; some
have objected that the use of such evidence
amounts to self-incrimination.59 The courts,
however, have emphasized the fourth
amendment arguments, without fully dis-
cussing the fifth amendment objections. The
Supreme Court indicated that there is a
close relationship between the two amend-
ments, when it determined that the com-
pulsory production of documents com-
pelled a person to be a witness against him-
self, and was the equivalent of an illegal
search and seizure6 ° Could it not also be
56 Ibid.
57 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 48, at 119; 2 Mc-
HUGH & CALLAN, MORAL THEOLOGY § 2411 (rev.
ed. 1958).
58 2 MCHUGH & CALLAN, Op. cit. supra note 57.
59 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
68 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
said that evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure, such as by eavesdropp-
ing coupled with a trespass, is compelling
a person to be a witness against himself?
In the eavesdropping and wiretapping
area, conversations and not merely docu-
ments, are being introduced as evidence
against the accused. Where a violation of
the constitutional guarantees of the fourth
amendment has been found, the exclusion-
ary rule has protected the accused,61 and
thus the self-incrimination argument has
not been necessary.
While considering some of the evils of
wiretapping and eavesdropping, and espe-
cially their resemblance to illegal searches
and seizures, it must be borne in mind that
the fourth amendment forbids only unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. To this ex-
tent, the Federal Communications Act pro-
tects the public against wiretapping even
more than the fourth amendment would
have, had it been found applicable. Thus
even if the Supreme Court should find at
some later date that wiretapping does vio-
late the fourth amendment, this would not
necessarily preclude all wiretapping under
all circumstances. What constitutes a rea-
sonable use of wiretapping would be the
next problem to be solved. It would seem
that a strictly controlled use of wiretaps
under court authorization would be quite
reasonable for constitutional purposes.12
Since personal rights are held in such
high regard, government interference with
these rights should not be tolerated unless
a greater good will be obtained. Personal
rights are not absolute; they must yield
when the good of the community as a
61 See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
62 Kamisar, The Wiretapping - Eavesdropping
Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV.
891, 912 (1960).
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whole demands this. The good to be ob-
tained in this case is the protection of the
community from criminals. The primary
question should be whether the good to
be obtained from the use of wiretapping
and other listening devices justifies the im-
pairment of individual privacy which must
follow. Law-enforcement officers insist that
surreptitious listening devices are invaluable
aids in the detection and apprehension of
criminals. The Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation uses wiretaps in national security
cases and cases which involve human life. 63
It considers such use indispensible. On the
local level, district attorneys find the use
of wiretaps invaluable in combating or-
ganized crime, especially crimes connected
with gambling and narcotics.64 One dis-
trict attorney stated that "telephonic inter-
ception is the single most valuable weapon
in the fight against organized crime." 5
The feeling of law-enforcement officers in
this regard is quite general. Since not all
eavesdropping violates the fourth amend-
ment, there is probably less discussion of
this problem. However, the use of sur-
reptitious listening devices is analagous to
wiretapping, and it can be presumed that
it is also a valuable aid to law-enforcement
officers.
The mere fact that wiretapping and
eavesdropping are helpful to police officers
does not justify their use. The good to be
obtained from the utilization of such de-
vices is being balanced against fundamental
human and moral rights. The apparent
63 Kennedy, Attorney General's Opinion on
Wiretaps, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1962, § 6 (Maga-
zine), p. 21, at 80.
64 Hearings on S. 1086, 1221, 1495, and 1822
Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1961).
r5 Id. at 430.
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need for the employment of such devices
by police officers, however, is a reasonable
ground for sacrificing some rights under
very limited and closely controlled circum-
stances.
In discussing the moral problems in-
volved, it should be noted that the vio-
lation of secrets is justified only to prevent
grave harm to the state."6 "The violation
of secrets is a harm to the public good
and a greater harm than ordinary evils
against the community (such as the escape
of a guilty person); but it is a less harm
than serious evils against the people (such
as menace to public he.alth, sedition, or
treason)." ° Thus the moral justification
for violating a person's right to his secrets
also depends upon the good to be achieved,
or the evil to be avoided. Certainly the
investigation and revelation of secrets is
justified in cases of treason.68 It would also
seem to be justified in cases wherein the
use of such methods is necessary to save
human life, or in crimes which involve the
general public welfare to a great extent,
such as the peddling of narcotics. Whether
the use of such methods can be justified in
gambling cases is a bit more difficult, and
must be determined by moral theologians.
One of the most disturbing aspects of
the wiretapping problem is that each time
wiretap evidence is introduced in a criminal
trial, a federal crime is committed.69 The
very officers who are sworn to uphold the
law, violate the law in order to convict a
criminal. The crime is not committed be-
fore the trial, or if it is, still another crime
66 See 2 MCHUGH & CALLAN, op. cit. supra note
57; 2 NOLDIN-SCHMITT, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MO-
RALIS §672 (1951).
67 2 McHUGH & CALLAN, MORAL THEOLOGY
§ 2417 (rev. ed. 1958).
68 See ibid.
69 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
is committed by the act of divulging the
contents of the conversation in open court.
The tribunals created to administer justice,
condone the crime committed in their pres-
ence. When the government condones the
commission of a crime in its very halls of
justice, can it reasonably expect others to
hold the law in respect? Mr. Justice
Brandeis expressed this thought quite
forcefully in his dissent in the Olmstead
case. He stated:
In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Govern-
ment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious.
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy.70
Conclusion
The present status of the law with re-
gard to wiretapping and eavesdropping is
the result of rather technical legalistic rea-
soning. A fair analysis of the principles
embodied in the fourth amendment should
indicate that its purpose is to protect the
very fundamental human right of privacy.
It seems clear that it was not intended to
be restricted in its interpretation to a literal
application of the words "persons, houses,
papers, and effects." The words of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter concerning the four-
teenth amendment are also applicable to
the fourth: "Since due process is not a
mechanical yardstick, it does not afford
mechanical answers."71 The Olmstead de-
cision is a "mechanical answer" to a citi-
zen's demand for the protection of rights
70 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (dissenting opinion).
71Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954)
(dissenting opinion).
embodied in the fourth amendment
Since wiretapping and eavesdropping are
so closely related, it would have been
illogical to allow one and ban the other. The
line is drawn only when there has been an
initial or concurrent trespass. Thus the
legality of eavesdropping depends upon the
position of the apparatus, and not upon
the end result of the deed. Is the use of
a detectaphone less harmful than the use
of a "spike-mike," when we consider that
both achieve the same result?
Because of the technical state of the
law, we are now faced with two extremes.
Legally all wiretapping is forbidden, but
at least some eavesdropping is permitted.
No matter how helpful or essential the use
of a wiretap might be to the police, the
law forbids it; but no restriction is placed
upon the use of a detectaphone or other
device which does not require a physical
trespass.
Several bills have been proposed in
Congress to remedy this situation.12 In
general these bills would authorize the use
of wiretap evidence in criminal trials when
state law permits wiretaps pursuant to a
court determination that certain conditions
exist. One bill would also prohibit eaves-
dropping, except under the same condi-
tions that apply to wiretapping.73 The bills
72 See S. 1086, 1221, 1495 and 1822, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961).
Recent Decision:
Determination of Citizenship Status
"Not only is United States citizenship a
'high privilege', it is a priceless treasure," 1
1Johnson v. Eisentranger, 339 U.S. 763, 791
(1950) (dissenting opinion).
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differ in determining what are valid reasons
for granting such permission.
Remedial legislation of this type, es-
pecially if eavesdropping were placed under
the same restrictions as wiretapping, would
provide an adequate remedy to the present
confusion. It would protect basic human
rights, and at the same time allow limited
police interference when the public good
demands this. Such a rule is more con-
sistent with constitutional guarantees, and
with the moral right of each individual to
his secrets. Eavesdropping and wiretapping
cannot be justified morally when the police
are dealing with crimes which do not have
a grave effect on the public good. Exactly
where to draw the line is a difficult prob-
lem and requires study by moral the-
ologians and law-enforcement officers alike.
If Congress does nothing else in this
field, it should at least permit the divul-
gence in criminal trials of information
obtained by wiretapping when state law
permits this. We have tolerated the com-
mission of a crime in our courts too long
already. The government must encourage
respect for the law, and open defiance of
the law does not have this effect. The law
may be unwise; but then the law should
be changed, not openly violated. Such a
change is essential, and let us hope, im-
minent.
78S. 1221, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961).
Mr. Justice Black has remarked. To this
might be added the observation, "no one's
right to this status should be finally adjudi-
cated or determined except by the Courts
in a judicial proceeding. '' 2 Whereas will-
2 Mah Ying Og v. Clark, 81 F. Supp. 696, 697
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ing acceptance of the former comment may
be given by all, the latter expresses a sen-
timent subject to qualifications and vary-
ing views on the proper form and scope of
judicial proceeding. 3
Recently, in Rusk v. Cort," the United
States Supreme Court denied on appeal
the Secretary of State's motion to dismiss
and held that a person outside the United
States who has been denied a right of cit-
izenship is not confined to the procedures
prescribed by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 [hereinafter referred
to as the Act of 1952],5 but rather may
pursue an action for declaratory and in-
junctive relief. The Secretary had con-
tended that the Act of 1952 provided the
exclusive procedure for attack on the ad-
ministrative determination that plaintiff
was not a citizen. After the State Depart-
ment's Board of Review on Loss of Na-
tionality had upheld the Passport Office's
denial of a passport to the plaintiff, a physi-
cian born in Massachusetts, but residing
in Czechoslovakia, he sought a declaratory
judgment on his citizenship status to over-
come the Board's ruling that he had been
denationalized. The ruling was based on
a finding that plaintiff had remained abroad
for purposes of evading or avoiding mili-
tary service--conduct proscribed by Sec-
tion 349(a)(10) of the Act of 19526
which dictates loss of citizenship as a con-
sequence.
(D.D.C. 1948) (emphasis added).
3Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955);
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922);
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905);
Ly Shew v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 50 (N.D.
Cal. S.D. 1953).
4369 U.S. 367 (1962).
5 §360, 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503
(1958).
6 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1958).
Loss or denial of citizenship can mean
not only a deprivation of liberty but also
"loss of property and life; or all that makes
life worth living."'7 Thus fundamental and
vital problems arise when the right of the
sovereign power to absolute control over
aliens" seems to clash with the personal
guarantees afforded by the fifth amend-
ment.
In 1905 the Supreme Court in United
States v. Ju Toy,' a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, held that an adverse administra-
tive determination, in accordance with a
statute making the executive decision final
in exclusion proceedings, was binding on
one seeking admission into this country
under a claim of citizenship. The fact of
citizenship was treated as any other dis-
puted fact in the proceedings. Moreover,
Mr. Justice Holmes announced, "the pe-
titioner, although physically within our
boundaries, is to be regarded as if he had
been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction
and kept there while his right to enter was
under debate."' 1 Furthermore, he contin-
ued, "due process of law does not require
judicial trial"'1 with respect to the peti-
tioner, even assuming that the fifth amend-
ment is applicable and that to deny a citi-
zen entrance is a deprivation of liberty.
In 1922 the Ng Fung Ho v. White12 case
affirmed Ju Toy, but added that where the
proceeding was to deport an alien rather
than exclude him, due process of law re-
quired a judicial trial on the fact of citizen-
Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra note 3, at 284.
8 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603
(1889).
9 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
'lId. at 263.
11 Ibid. See AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 366-68 (2d ed. 1961).
12 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
ship. Ng Fung Ho concluded that a claim
of citizenship supported by evidence suf-
ficient, if believed, to warrant a favorable
decision was entitled to be tested in the
courts because the claim is a "denial of
an essential jurisdictional fact.' 13 Other-
wise any resident after being adjudged an
alien by an administrative board might be
deported on a purely executive order. This
is so because "where there is jurisdiction
a finding of fact by the executive depart-
ment is conclusive," said Mr. Justice Bran-
deis.' 4 Although citizensh ip is an "essen-
tial jurisdictional fact" in exclusion no less
than in deportation proceedings, the Court
ignored the inconsistency, and a distinction
between exclusion and deportation pro-
ceedings was created and has remained-
these cases have never been overruled. Con-
gress, however, in the Nationality Act of
194015 [hereinafter referred to as the 1940
Act] created an alternate avenue for judicial
determinations other than the habeas cor-
pus proceedings which Ju Toy and Ng Fung
Ho involved.
This act allowed a person to institute an
action for a judgment declaring him to be
a national of the United States "regardless
of whether he is within the United States
or abroad."'" This procedural right was to
a trial de novo, or an original action, to
determine the fact of citizenship wherever
and whenever denied by administrative au-
thority. Furthermore, it provided that one
abroad could obtain from an American
consular officer a certificate of identity en-
titling him to enter the United States to
litigate personally. If the action failed he
13 Id. at 284.
14 Ibid.
15Ch. 876, § 503, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
16Ch. 876, §503, 54 Stat. 1171 (1940).
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then became subject to deportation.17
Opening up access to the courts, how-
ever, ultimately led to abuses commencing
after the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion
Act and the Communist successes in China;
notably the increase in fraudulent entries
facilitated by instituting sham declaratory
judgment citizenship actions.' 8 The alien
would gain entrance under the certificate
of identity and abandon the suit while
disappearing into the mainstream of the
population. Neither the bar nor the courts
initially appreciated the breadth of the
opportunities lurking in the 1940 Act. In
the first five years after its passage only
four actions were brought, but by the end
of 1952 some 1,288 suits had been insti-
tuted.19
To curb these abuses Congress enacted
section 360 of the Act of 1952, evincing
in subsection (a): (1) an intent to confirm
the rule stated in Ju Toy that an adminis-
trative determination of the fact of citizen-
ship in exclusion proceedings is not sub-
ject to trial de novo; and (2) an intent to
limit the right to institute actions for judi-
cial declaration of nationality to those phy-
sically within the United States, - which
in effect, codified the Ng Fung Ho case. 20
17 Ibid.
Is Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 390 (1962).
19 Zimmerman, Judicial Versus Administrative
Determination Of Controverted Claims To
United States Citizenship, 43 GEO. L.J. 19, 46
(1954); Note, The Right To Judicial Review Of
An Administrative Finding On The Fact Of
Citizenship In Exclusion Cases, 1950 Wis. L.
REV. 677.
20 § 360(a), 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a) (1958): "(a) If any person who is
within the United States claims a right or privi-
lege as a national of the United States and is
denied such right or privilege by any department
or independent agency, or official thereof, upon
the ground that he is not a national of the United
States, such person may institute an action
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In addition, section 360(b) provides for the
issuance of certificates of identity to two
classes of persons not within the United
States: those physically present in this coun-
try at a prior time and those under sixteen
years of age, born abroad of a United
States citizen parent.21 Appeal from a de-
under the provisions of [the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958)], against the
. ..department or .. . agency for a judgment
declaring him to be a national of the United
States, except that no such action may be insti-
tuted in any case if the issue of such person's
status as a national of the United States (1.)
arose by reason of, or in connection with any
exclusion proceeding . . . or (2.) is in issue
in any such proceeding. An action ...may be
instituted only within five years after the final
administrative denial .... (J] urisdiction over such
officials in such cases is conferred upon [the dis-
trict courts of the United States]." (Emphasis
added.)
21 66 Stat. 273(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (1958):
"(b) If any person who is not within the United
States claims a right or privilege as a national
of the United States and is denied such right or
privilege by any department or independent
agency, or official thereof, upon the ground
that he is not a national of the United States,
such person may make application to a diplo-
matic or consular officer of the United States
in the foreign country in which he is residing
for a certificate of identity for the purpose of
travelling to a port of entry in the United
States and applying for admission. Upon proof
to the satisfaction of [those] officer[s] that such
application is made in good faith and has a
substantial basis, he shall issue to such person a
certificate of identity. From any denial of an
application for such certificate the applicant
shall be entitled to an appeal to the Secretary
of State who, if he approves the denial shall
state in writing his reasons for his decision. The
Secretary of State shall prescribe rules and regu-
lations for the issuance of certificates of iden-
tity as above provided. The provisions of this
subsection shall be applicable only to a person
who at some time prior to his application for
the certificate of identity has been physically
present in the United States, or to a person
under sixteen years of age who was born
abroad of a United States citizen parent." (Em-
phasis added.)
nial of these certificates is made only to
the Secretary of State, as their issuance is
purely an administrative matter. Further,
section 360(c) directs that upon arrival
such persons apply for admission to the
United States under normal alien proceed-
ings, and that a final adverse determination
of the claim to citizenship by the Attorney
General shall be reviewable "in habeas cor-
pus proceedings and not otherwise. ' '2 2
Section 10(a) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, however, states that declara-
tory judgment is available as a form of ju-
dicial review of any agency action causing
a legal wrong.23 Whether the plaintiff at
bar could avail himself of an action for
declaratory judgment through the relief
provisions of section 10 became the major
question in the present case. The majority
contended that section 360 of the Act of
1952 was fashioned to circumscribe the
easy-entry provisions of the 1940 Act and
to apply normal immigration procedures,
22 66 Stat. 274 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(c) (1958):
"(c) A person who has been issued a certificate
of identity [under subsection (b)] may apply for
admission to the United States . . .and shall be
subject to all the provisions of this Chapter re-
lating to the conduct of proceedings involving
aliens seeking admission to the United States. A
final determination by the Attorney General that
any such person is not entitled to admission to
the United States shall be subject to review by
any court of competent. jurisdiction in habeas
corpus proceedings and not otherwise. Any per-
son described in this section who is finally ex-
cluded from admission to the United States
shall be subject to all the provisions of this
Chapter relating to aliens seeking admission to
the United States." (Emphasis added.)
3260 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
Section 12 of this act provides that "no subse-
quent legislation shall -be held to supersede or
modify the provisions of this Chapter except
to the extent that such legislation shall do so
expressly." 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011
(1958).
with judicial review by habeas corpus only,
to those abroad who choose to enter under
a certificate of identity. It was not intended
to apply to claimants who seek a determin-
ation of citizenship while still abroad, i.e.,
those who do not apply for admission to
the United States before prevailing on their
claims of citizenship. Thus the Court found
that the broad remedial provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act 24 and the
Declaratory Judgments Act 25 were avail-
able to the plaintiff.
In the dissent Mr. Justice Harlan took
these conclusions to task. He declared that
allowing the action in the present case to
fall within the purview of the Declaratory
Judgments Act and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act denies that section 360 is the
exclusive remedy available to nonresidents
and is "plainly inconsistent with the Con-
gressional purpose [and] refuted . . . by
the background and legislative history of
that section."26 In recalling the legislative
history of section 360, the dissent stressed
the proposals of the Departments of State
and Justice made before the Joint Hearings
on the bill. 27 The State Department had
suggested that declaratory, relief for per-
2460 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
25 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
26 Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 388 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion). After restating the traditional
rules formulated by Ju Toy and Ng Fung Ho,
the dissent attacked the contention that declara-
tory judgment relief had been available prior to
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure
Act as a remedy to secure determination of citi-
zenship. The case of Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S.
325 (1939) had been advanced by the majority
to establish that proposition, but the dissent
asserted that because the petitioner in EIg was
a resident the case was distinguishable.
2 Hearings on S. 716, H.R. 2379 and H.R.
2816 Before the Subcommittees of. the Com-
mittees on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951).
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sons abroad be limited to those whose
original citizenship status was not in doubt,
but who were deemed to have lost it and
that certificates of identity be permitted al-
lowing these persons, if they chose, to en-
ter the country in aid of their suits. 2 The
Justice Department alternately recommend-
ed that normal immigration procedures be
applied to all. nonresidents, restricting cer-
tificate of identity holders to habeas corpus
as the sole means of obtaining review of
administrative decisions.2 9 Thus, according
to the dissent, in enacting section 360
"congress .. .squarely faced with making,
or not making declaratory relief available
to nonresident citizenship claimants, chose
the latter course. ' 30
The majority, however, pointed to its
previous decisions in Shaughnessy v. Pe-
dreiro,31 and Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 2
as teaching that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act also makes available judicial
review of administrative decisions ren-
dered under the Act of 1952, in the ab-
sence of clear and convincing evidence
that Congress intended otherwise. In Pe-
driero, the Court granted declaratory judg-
ment via Section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act as an alternative to habeas
corpus in testing the validity of a deporta-
tion order. There a resident alien was re-
sisting a deportation order on the grounds
that it was violative of due process and
lacked sufficient evidence to justify it.
In Shung, the Court said that it was broaden-
ing the form of judicial relief by allowing
declaratory judgment via the Administra-
28ld. at 710.
29 Id. at 720.
SORusk v. Cort, supra note 26, at 396 (dissenting
opinion).
31 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
32 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
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tive Procedure Act although this was in
no way to enlarge the scope of review.
Here the alien sought declaratory judgment
review of an exclusion order on the basis
of Pedreiro.3
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, brought
out that these cases were strictly deporta-
tion and exclusion cases, neither involving
a claim to citizenship. The distinction is
that, whereas the sections to the Act of
1952 dealing with cases of this type pro-
vide for no specific relief, such is not the
case in the sections of the act dealing with
nationality. 4
Despite this argument, the majority de-
termined that section 360 is not an exclu-
sive remedy for reviewing administrative
decisions. Rather it was felt that the lan-
guage of section 360(b), reading that one
not in the United States who has been de-
nied a right or privilege may make appli-
cation for a certificate, connotes permissive,
not mandatory, legislative intent. Thus, in-
asmuch as the plaintiff at bar did not
choose to seek entry by means of such a
certificate, the majority opinion, as de-
livered by Mr. Justice Stewart, declared
him as not being within 360(b) and there-
fore free to avail himself of any alternate
remedy extant.
By allowing nonresidents to institute
declaratory judgment actions in the face
of the provisions of section 360 of the
s See generally Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.
2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), afl'd, 346 U.S. 929
(1954) (per curiam); Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953); WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 130-32b (1961).
3a Rusk v. Cort, supra note 26, at 397 (dissent-
ing opinion). This is no longer true by virtue of
Pub. L. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105
(a) (Supp. 1962), which, according to the dis-
sent, rejects the Shung case by making habeas
corpus the sole judicial remedy in exclusion
proceedings.
Act of 1952, provided they do not attempt
to enter the country, the Court apparently
has interpreted the Administrative Proced-
ure Act liberally, while strictly construing
the provisions of the Act of 1952. The im-
portance of the rights involved no doubt
underlies this approach. As pointed out by
Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion, to apply section 360(b) in the
manner insisted upon by the dissent would
force a citizen to reduce himself to the
status of an alien in many circumstances in
which he found himself outside the United
States. He cast grave doubts whether the
habeas corpus proceeding alone would
satisfy constitutional due process of law,
noting that in descending to the status of an
alien, a citizen would necessarily, in this
procedure, subject himself to arrest.35
In this connection it should be noted
that when the Ju Toy and Ng Fung Ho
cases were decided the number of Ameri-
can citizens travelling or working abroad
was not near the level it is in today's world.
Were Mr. Justice Brandeis writing for the
Court today, the deportation-exclusion dis-
tinction would probably be assailed by him
as an untenable basis for differing results.
He would, no doubt, still insist that the
issue of citizenship be decided by due
process amounting to a full judicial trial
whenever the credible evidence would sup-
port a finding of citizenship.3 6 Certainly
35 Rusk v. Cort, supra note 26, at 381 (concur-
ring opinion). The facts of this case are graphic
on this point. Here the government conceded
affirmatively, as well as in the procedural ad-
mission on the motion to dismiss, that the plain-
tiff had been a citizen. To compel a citizen
to defend his right to continuing citizenship by
undergoing arrest merely because he happens to
be outside of the United States at the time seems
a difficult morsel for the American system of
due process to digest.
36 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
the specious geographical distinctions,
which resulted in the inconsistency of hold-
ing that the fact of citizenship commands
different judicial rights depending on the
part of the world the claimant finds him-
self, are hardly defensible in the modern
world.
By employing the provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act as in Rusk,
the Court appears to have restored much
of the liberality of the 1940 Act. Fortu-
nately, however, this does not require that
the abuses which arose from that act are
apt to be repeated. While recognizing that
section 360(b) (c) applies to nonresidents
who choose to enter the United States, the
Court has nevertheless extended full judi-
cial remedies to those abroad if they seek
the remedy before attempting entrance. At
the same time, fraudulent entrance can
still be controlled by section 360(b).
Against this thought, of course, is the fact that
Congress enacted § 360 with the geographi-
cal distinctions as late as 1952 and has al-
lowed them to remain. Further, the distinction
between exclusion and deportation proceedings
was the subject of notable litigation in the late
1940's; the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit vigorously asserting the distinction, while
the Ninth Circuit with equal vigor was attempt-
ing to liberalize the doctrines. In the case of
Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239 (9th
Cir. 1948), the court extended the guarantee of
a court hearing on citizenship to a former resi-
dent who enlisted in the Merchant Marine dur-
ing the war but was barred as an alien without
a passport on his vessel's return in 1945. The
Delaney case was a departure from the rule
established by the Ju Toy and Ng Fung Ho
decisions because it held that right to trial on
the fact of citizenship is guaranteed when sup-
ported by substantial evidence provided the
claimant is a resident. Contrasted with this,
the Second Circuit, in Chu Leung v. Shaugh-
nessy, 176 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1949), rejecting
residence as a determinative factor of the right
to a court trial, said that a returning resident
claiming citizenship must be denied a judicial
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Although the relief allowed is de novo,
the claimant, it would seem, must still ex-
haust his administrative remedy since the
relief provided by Sections 10 and 12 of
the Administrative Procedure Act is from
agency determinations.3 7 In view of this,
the district courts are not likely to be sub-
jected to a plethora of suits reminiscent
of the 1940 Act, which allowed direct
actions to be instituted at anytime. Against
this, of course, it is likely that the habeas
corpus proceedings under 360(b)(c) are
likely to be abandoned in favor of the
alternate relief given here. Thus, although
the Ju Toy and Ng Fung Ho decisions are
still alive implicitly in section 360(b) (c),
they may die on the vine from disuse.
Certainly, the affording of the fullest
possible judicial determination on so fun-
damental an issue as a claim to citizenship
is highly desirable under traditional Ameri-
can ideas of guaranteeing fundamental
rights. It is unfortunate that the history
of the legislation in this area forces the
Court in the pursuit of this ideal to strain
the language of statutes. Perhaps Congress
might help by redrafting the Immigration
and Nationality Act to protect the national
interest in controlling aliens while safe-
guarding the personal liberties of citizens
with the security of judicial review over
administrative authority.
trial of the fact of citizenship. Interestingly, this
court noted that the relator there did have a
judicial avenue open to him via the provisions
of the Nationality Act of 1940: in effect a
trial de nova or an original action, regardless
of whether he is within the United States or
abroad. See United States ex rel. Medeiros v.
Watkins, 166 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1948); 49
COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1949); Note, 1950 Wis.
L. REV. 677.
3T In the instant case, the majority makes the
(Continued on page 263)
